Arbitration Case Law Update 2015 by Gross, Jill I
Pace University 
DigitalCommons@Pace 
Pace Law Faculty Publications School of Law 
5-21-2015 
Arbitration Case Law Update 2015 
Jill I. Gross 
Pace Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty 
 Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, and the Securities Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jill I. Gross, Arbitration Case Law Update 2015, in Securities Arbitration 2015 (PLI Course Handbook, May 
21, 2015), http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/1046/. 
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2611212 
Arbitration Case Law Update 2015 
 
By 
 
Jill I. Gross 
James D. Hopkins Professor of Law 
Director, Investor Rights Clinic, Pace Law School 
 
 
 
May 21, 2015
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2611212 
 2 
This chapter1 identifies decisions by the U.S. Supreme 
Court and selected federal circuit and high state courts in the past 
year that interpret and apply the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 
and could have an impact on securities arbitration practice.2 
 
I. SUPREME COURT 
 
For the first time in several years, the Supreme Court has 
not decided an arbitration case in the time period since the 
publication of the previous PLI Arbitration Law Update.  The 
Court did, however, grant a petition for a writ of certiorari in one 
case.   
 
In DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia,3  the Supreme Court 
agreed to hear an appeal from a California Court of Appeal 
decision4 holding that a California choice of law clause in the 
parties’ arbitration agreement (which the parties agreed was 
governed by the FAA) trumped the federal law-based FAA 
preemption doctrine (which provides that the FAA preempts 
conflicting state law).  In DIRECTV, consumers filed a class action 
in state court against the satellite television provider for charging 
customers an early termination fee allegedly in violation of various 
California statutes.5  The form contract governing the satellite 
service contained a pre-dispute arbitration clause, a class action 
waiver, and a choice of law clause that provided: 
 
                                                 
1 In writing this chapter, I am grateful for the able research assistance of 
Rana Marie Abihabib, Pace Law School, J.D. candidate 2016. 
2 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (2014). Because disputes resolved through 
securities arbitration necessarily “involve commerce” (FAA § 2), courts 
apply the FAA to legal issues arising out of securities arbitrations. See 
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002).   
3 135 S.Ct. 1547 (2015). 
4 See Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 190 (2014), cert. 
granted, 135 S.Ct. 1547 (2015).   
5 Id. at 192-93. 
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“The interpretation and enforcement of this 
Agreement shall be governed by the rules and regulations 
of the Federal Communications Commission, other 
applicable federal laws, and the laws of the state and local 
area where Service is provided to you.  This Agreement is 
subject to modification if required by such laws. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Section 9 [the arbitration 
clause including class action waiver] shall be governed by 
the Federal Arbitration Act.”6 
 
Notably, the class action waiver clause also stated: “If, however, 
the law of your state would find this agreement to dispense with 
class arbitration procedures unenforceable, then this entire Section 
9 is unenforceable.”7   
 
 Based on this sentence, defendants did not initially move 
to compel arbitration because the governing law of California at 
the time – known as the Discover Bank rule8 – would have voided 
the arbitration agreement as unconscionable due to the class action 
waiver.  However, after the Supreme Court held in AT&T Mobility 
v. Concepcion9 that the FAA preempted California’s Discover 
Bank rule, defendants moved to compel individual arbitration.10   
 
 The trial court denied the motion and the California Court 
of Appeal affirmed.  The Court of Appeal interpreted the class 
action waiver provision and found that reigning California law 
“would find this agreement to dispense with class arbitration 
procedures unenforceable.”11  As a result, the entire arbitration 
                                                 
6 Id. at 193 (quoting parties’ agreement). 
7 Id. (quoting parties’ agreement). 
8 Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005) 
(classifying most class action waivers in consumer contracts as 
unconscionable). 
9 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011). 
10 DIRECTV, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d at 193. 
11 Id.  
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clause was not enforceable, according to the precise language of 
section 9 of the contract.  The Court rejected defendant’s argument 
that Discover Bank was no longer state law because it was 
preempted, and instead accepted plaintiffs’ argument that it should 
interpret state law without regard to FAA preemption.12 
 
Because the California Court of Appeal’s decision 
conflicts with a Ninth Circuit holding that the FAA preemption 
doctrine supersedes the parties’ choice of law clause,13 DIRECTV 
sought review in the Supreme Court (the California Supreme Court 
had denied its request for review.)  The question presented 
is:  “Whether the California Court of Appeal erred by holding, in 
direct conflict with the Ninth Circuit, that a reference to state law 
in an arbitration agreement governed by the Federal Arbitration 
Act requires the application of state law preempted by the Federal 
Arbitration Act.”14 
 
 It is not likely that the Supreme Court will permit parties 
to opt out of the FAA preemption doctrine via a choice of law 
clause, particularly if the arbitration contract is governed by the 
FAA.  The Court will likely distinguish Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. 
of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,15 in which the Supreme 
Court held that parties can avoid the application of the FAA 
through a choice-of-law clause in their pre-dispute arbitration 
agreement.  However, Volt involved the alleged preemption of a 
state procedural rule favoring arbitration, not preemption of a 
substantive state anti-arbitration principle.  Thus, I predict that the 
Court will reverse the California Court of Appeal’s decision. 
 
                                                 
12 Id. at 194-97. 
13 See Murphy v. DirecTV, Inc., 724 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2013). 
14 Pet. for Writ of Cert., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 2014 WL 5359805 
(U.S. Oct. 21, 2014). 
15 489 U.S. 468 (1989). 
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II. FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS  
 
The remainder of this chapter summarizes decisions from 
lower federal courts and state high courts applying the Supreme 
Court’s FAA jurisprudence when ruling on challenges to the 
arbitrability of a particular dispute and on motions to confirm or 
vacate arbitration awards.  Where applicable, the chapter will 
discuss implications for FINRA arbitration. 
 
 A. Who Decides Arbitrability? 
 
It is well-settled that courts, not arbitrators, decide 
challenges to substantive arbitrability of a dispute “’unless the 
parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise.’”16  Lower 
courts continue to find that the incorporation by reference of a 
forum’s rules that permit arbitrators to decide arbitrability 
constitutes such “clear and unmistakable evidence.”17  In an 
interesting twist that calls to mind a state court’s hostility to 
arbitration, the Supreme Court of West Virginia recently held that 
a clause stating that “[t]he arbitrator(s) shall determine all issues 
regarding the arbitrability of the dispute” is NOT clear and 
unmistakable evidence that the parties intended arbitrators to 
decide an unconscionability challenge to the arbitration 
agreement.18  
                                                 
16 Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S 79, 83 (2002). 
17 E.g., Eckert/Wordell Architects, Inc. v FJM Properties of Willmar 
LLC, 756 F.3d 1098, 1100 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that arbitrators decide 
threshold question of whether nonsignatory can compel signatory to 
arbitrate because arbitration agreement incorporates by reference AAA 
rules). 
18 See Schumacher Homes of Circleville, Inc. v. Spencer, --- S.E.2d ----, 
2015 WL 1880234 (W. Va. Apr. 24, 2015). 
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B. Defenses to Arbitrability 
 
In deciding questions of arbitrability, courts must apply the 
Moses H. Cone presumption of arbitrability,19 but must compel 
arbitration of only those disputes that the parties contracted to 
submit to arbitration.  Thus, courts must construe the terms of the 
parties’ arbitration agreement like any other contract to give effect 
to the parties’ intent.20 
 
Even if a court finds that a dispute falls within the scope of 
an arbitration agreement, the dispute might not be arbitrable under 
a few limited exceptions.  Under the Supreme Court’s most recent 
FAA jurisprudence, courts must enforce arbitration agreements 
according to their precise terms unless: 
 
1. there is an explicit contrary congressional command;  
2. the arbitration agreement expressly strips one party of the 
substantive right to pursue a federal statutory claim; or  
3. a state law contract defense invalidates the agreement, but 
only if that defense doesn’t discriminate against 
arbitration, and doesn’t frustrate the purposes of the 
FAA.21 
 
                                                 
19 See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 
U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (instructing courts to presume a dispute is arbitrable). 
20 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682 
(2010) (stating that “as with any other contract, the parties' intentions 
control”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
21 See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013) 
(holding that claimants can establish they cannot vindicate their federal 
statutory rights only if they show they are stripped of the right to pursue 
them, not the ability to pursue them); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 
132 S.Ct. 665 (2012) (reaffirming that federal statutory claims are 
arbitrable absent an explicit “contrary congressional command”); AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011) (ruling that FAA 
preempts state law unconscionability defense that declares class action 
 7 
 This section summarizes important federal Courts of 
Appeal decisions that have ruled on challenges to an arbitration 
agreement based on these principles. 
 
1. Scope 
 
 Courts sometimes conclude that a particular dispute is not 
encompassed within the scope of the parties’ arbitration 
agreements.  For example, in The NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc. v. 
UBS Securities, LLC,22 the Second Circuit found that UBS’ 
indemnification claims against the NASDAQ stock market for its 
trading losses stemming from trading delays on the morning of 
Facebook’s 2012 initial public offering were not covered by an 
arbitration agreement because they were encompassed within an 
express carve-out.  In that case, UBS sought to arbitrate its 
indemnification claims in the American Arbitration Association 
(AAA) pursuant to the parties’ Services Agreement.  That 
Agreement provided that the parties agree to submit all disputes 
arising out of the agreement to arbitration at AAA, “[e]xcept as 
may be provided in the NASDAQ OMX requirements.”23  In lieu 
of answering, NASDAQ filed an action in the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking, inter 
alia, a preliminary injunction halting the arbitration proceeding.  
The district court granted the injunction, and UBS appealed.24 
 
On appeal, after addressing issues of jurisdiction, the 
Court of Appeals rejected UBS’ argument that an arbitrator, not 
the district court, should have decided the arbitrability of the 
dispute.  It found that the Services Agreement did not “clearly and 
unmistakably direct that questions of arbitrability be decided” by 
                                                 
waivers in consumer arbitration agreements per se unconscionable as 
inconsistent with the FAA). 
22 770 F.3d 1010 (2d Cir. 2014). 
23 Id.at 1016. 
24 Id. at 1017. 
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the arbitrator.25  On the merits question of arbitrability, the court of 
Appeals concluded that the Services Agreement carved out UBS’ 
claims against NASDAQ from the arbitration clause.26  The court 
reasoned that, since the NASDAQ OMX requirements referenced 
in the arbitration clause include the regulations allegedly violated 
by NASDAQ which caused UBS’ trading losses, disputes 
stemming from those violations were exempted from the clause.27 
 
 2. Contrary Congressional Command 
 
Even if a dispute falls within the scope of an arbitration 
agreement, courts can refuse to enforce the agreement as to federal 
statutory claims if “the FAA’s mandate has been ‘overridden by a 
contrary Congressional command.’”28  Courts have held that one 
such explicit command is found in §922 of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-
Frank”).29  That section declares that pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements purporting to require arbitration of whistleblower 
claims arising under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”)30 
are not enforceable.31   
 
However, at least one court has held that this no-
arbitration provision does not apply to whistleblower claims 
                                                 
25 Id. at 1032. 
26 Id. at 1033. 
27 Id. at 1034. 
28 Italian Colors, 133 S.Ct. at 2309 (citing CompuCredit Corp. v. 
Greenwood, 132 S.Ct. 665, 668-69 (2012)) (second internal citation 
omitted). 
29 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
30 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
31 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e)(2) (2012); see Laubenstein v. Conair Corp., No. 
5:14-CV-05227, 2014 WL 6609164, at *4 (W.D. Ark. Nov. 19, 2014) 
(slip op.) (holding that arbitration agreement is unenforceable as to 
plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim arising under SOX). §806 of SOX 
gives a right of action to “whistleblowers” who report fraud at publicly-
traded companies.  See 18 U.S.C. §1514A (2012).  
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arising under Dodd-Frank.  In Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding 
Corp.,32 a former employee of TD Ameritrade sued his former 
employer in federal district court, alleging he was terminated in 
retaliation for reporting securities law violations to his supervisor.  
He claimed the termination violated the whistleblower protections 
accorded to him under Dodd-Frank.33  TD moved to dismiss the 
complaint and compel arbitration pursuant to a pre-dispute 
arbitration agreement the employee signed when he began his 
employment at TD.  The district court granted the motion to 
compel arbitration.34   
 
The Third Circuit affirmed.  Addressing an issue of first 
impression, the Court of Appeals held that the “anti-arbitration” 
provision of Dodd-Frank rendered unenforceable pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements with respect to whistleblower claims under 
SOX non-arbitrable, but not with respect to those arising under 
Dodd-Frank.35  The Court noted that whistleblower causes of 
action arising under SOX are “substantively different” from those 
arising under Dodd-Frank, and “each has its ‘own prohibited 
conduct, statute of limitations, and remedies.’”36  The Court of 
Appeals closely examined the statutory language and concluded 
that Congress intended to apply its non-arbitration provision in 
Dodd-Frank to SOX whistleblower claims only; not to Dodd-Frank 
whistleblower claims.37  Thus, claimant’s claims were arbitrable. 
 
                                                 
32 773 F.3d 488 (3d Cir. 2014). 
33 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(h)(1)(B)(i). This section of Dodd-Frank gives a 
private right of action to “whistleblowers” who are terminated in 
retaliation for providing information to the SEC, “participating in an SEC 
proceeding, or making disclosures required or protected under [SOX] and 
certain other securities laws.” Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 
1174 (2014) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(a)(6), (b)(1), (h)).  
34 773 F.3d at 490. 
35 Id. at 492. 
36 Id. at 491 (citing Ahmad v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 2 F. Supp.3d 491, 
497 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)). 
37 Id. at 492-94. 
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 Practitioners asserting whistleblower claims should be sure 
to cite the correct statutory authority for clients’ claims, especially 
if they want to avoid arbitration, as pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements are non-enforceable with respect to SOX, but not 
Dodd-Frank, whistleblower claims. 
 
In another case in which the court refused to compel 
arbitration in light of a competing statute, National Credit Union 
Administration Board v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.,38 the liquidating 
agent for a failed credit union sued an investment bank, claiming 
that the bank committed securities fraud in the offering documents 
covering sales of residential mortgage-backed securities.  The 
district court for the Southern District of New York denied the 
bank's motion to compel arbitration.39 
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed and held that, inter alia, 
the liquidating agent could repudiate the arbitration agreement 
pursuant to its statutory repudiation powers under the Financial 
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA).40  
While the court does not reference the Federal Arbitration Act or 
the “contrary congressional command” exception to the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements, one can infer that the 
court found that the statute providing the National Credit Union 
Administration Board with the power to repudiate agreements, 
FIRREA, superseded the FAA’s mandate that arbitration 
agreements be enforced according to their terms. 
 
 3. Effective Vindication: Enforceability of 
  Class Action Waivers  
 
Another defense to arbitrability that disputants have 
asserted is that a court should not enforce an arbitration agreement 
                                                 
38 775 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2014). 
39 Id. at 146. 
40 See 12 U.S.C. §1787 (2014). 
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because enforcement would prevent them from vindicating their 
statutory rights.  In Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,41 
the Supreme Court limited this “effective vindication” doctrine to 
cases where claimants can establish they are stripped of the right to 
pursue statutory rights, not the ability to pursue them.  In the past 
year, based on Italian Colors, at least one federal circuit has 
enforced a class action waiver in an arbitration clause against an 
“ineffective vindication” challenge.42  
 
 4. State law defenses 
 
a. Unconscionability  
 
Under the Supreme Court’s FAA preemption doctrine, the 
FAA preempts any state law or rule that conflicts with the policies 
and purposes underlying the FAA.43  While the Supreme Court in 
AT&T Mobility applied this preemption doctrine to bar lower 
courts from finding class action waivers in arbitration agreements 
to be substantively unconscionable under state law,44 lower courts 
continue to strike down arbitration clauses as unconscionable on 
other grounds.  For example, in Jackson v. Payday Financial, 
LLC,45  the Seventh Circuit found an arbitration clause in a payday 
loan agreement to be unconscionable.  In that case, plaintiffs, a 
                                                 
41 133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013). 
42 See, e.g., Torres v. Simpatico, Inc., 781 F.3d 963 (8th Cir. 2015) 
(rejecting unit franchisees’ ineffective vindication challenge to a 
franchise agreements’ arbitration clause with a class action waiver). 
43 See, e.g., Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S.Ct. 1201 
(2012) (holding that the FAA preempts West Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals rule that voided as against public policy pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses in nursing home contracts with respect to negligence claims); 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011) (holding that 
FAA preempts California’s Discover Bank rule that class action waivers 
in consumer arbitration agreements are unconscionable). 
44 See, e.g., Torres v. Simpatico, Inc., 781 F.3d 963 (8th Cir. 2015) (class 
action waiver clause not unconscionable). 
45 764 F.3d 765, 781 (7th Cir. 2014). 
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putative class of borrowers who obtained allegedly usurious 
payday loans from an enrolled member of the Cheyenne River 
Sioux Tribe, sued the lender for various violations of Illinois laws.  
The district court dismissed the action for improper venue because 
the loan agreements contained a forum selection clause that 
required all disputes be resolved through arbitration conducted by 
the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe.46 
 
 The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the “arbitral 
mechanism specified in the agreement is illusory.”47 The court 
noted that the forum specified “does not exist: The Cheyenne 
River Sioux Tribe ‘does not authorize Arbitration,’ it ‘does not 
involve itself in the hiring of ... arbitrator[s],’ and it does not have 
consumer dispute rules.”48  
 The court further concluded that the illusory agreement 
was procedurally and substantively unconscionable under Illinois 
law.49 The court stated:   
It is procedurally unconscionable because the Plaintiffs 
could not have ascertained or understood the arbitration 
procedure to which they were agreeing because it did not 
exist. It is substantively unconscionable because it allowed 
the Loan Entities to manipulate what purported to be a fair 
arbitration process by selecting an arbitrator and 
proceeding according to nonexistent rules.50   
Therefore, the arbitration clause was not enforceable. 
                                                 
46 Id. at 768. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 776 (citing evidence in the record). 
49 Id. at 778, 780 (“The arbitration clause here is void not simply because 
of a strong possibility of arbitrator bias, but because it provides that a 
decision is to be made under a process that is a sham from stem to 
stern.”). 
50 Id. at 781. 
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  b. Waiver  
 
Another state law-based defense to the obligation to 
arbitrate is the waiver doctrine.  Under this doctrine, one party to 
an arbitration clause claims the other party waived its right to 
arbitrate based on conduct in related litigation.  While the 
arbitration waiver test varies slightly among the federal circuits, 
courts typically consider factors such as: (1) the time elapsed from 
commencement of litigation to the request for arbitration; (2) the 
amount and nature of litigation, including substantive motions and 
discovery; and (3) prejudice to the party opposing arbitration.51  
 
 This past year, courts continued to examine these factors 
when ruling on waiver arguments.  For example, in Joca-Roca 
Real Estate, LLC v. Brennan,52 an asset purchaser sued the seller 
for fraud in court, even though the asset purchase agreement 
contained an arbitration clause.  After the parties engaged in 
extensive discovery, including sixteen depositions, substantial 
interrogatories and document production, and four discovery 
conferences before the magistrate, plaintiff moved to stay 
proceedings pending arbitration.53  Defendant objected, arguing 
plaintiff had waived its right to arbitrate.54   
 The court first identified a “salmagundi of factors” 
relevant to the determination as to whether a party waived its right 
to arbitrate.55  Those factors include: “the length of the delay, the 
                                                 
51 See, e.g., Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, P.A. v. NCR Corp., 
376 F. App’x 70, 71 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP v. 
Auffenberg, 646 F.3d 919, 924 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“By this opinion we 
alert the bar in this Circuit that failure to invoke arbitration at the first 
available opportunity will presumptively extinguish a client's ability later 
to opt for arbitration.”). 
52 772 F.3d 945 (1st Cir. 2014). 
53 Id. at 947. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 948. 
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extent to which the party seeking to invoke arbitration has 
participated in the litigation, the quantum of discovery and other 
litigation-related activities that have already taken place, the 
proximity of the arbitration demand to an anticipated trial date, and 
the extent to which the party opposing arbitration would be 
prejudiced.”56   
 In concluding that plaintiff had waived its arbitration right, 
the court found, “the plaintiff commenced a civil action, 
vigorously prosecuted it, and then—after many months of active 
litigation—tried to switch horses midstream to pursue an arbitral 
remedy. To make matters worse, it made this abrupt about-face in 
the absence of any material change in circumstances.”57  The court 
also had no difficulty finding prejudice to the defendant in the 
form of the substantial time and cost it devoted to the litigation.58 
In contrast, in Shy v. Navistar Int’l Corp.,59 an accounting 
dispute, the Sixth Circuit held that defendant-appellant had not 
waived its right to arbitrate a dispute with intervenor-appellee.   
The case arose out of a consent decree settling a class action 
lawsuit relating to Navistar’s obligations to its retired employees.  
The fiduciary for the trust set up to receive profit-sharing 
contributions from defendant sought to intervene into the class 
action to challenge the calculation of those contributions.60  The 
agreement setting up that entity, however, contained a dispute 
resolution clause requiring an accounting arbitration if disputes 
over such calculations arose.61   
                                                 
56 Id.  
57 Id. at 948-49. 
58 Id. at 949; see also In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 754 F.3d 
1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2014) (by pursuing arbitrability challenge in 
district court and losing, bank waived its right to invoke delegation clause 
in arbitration agreement that delegated to arbitrator the power to decide 
arbitrability disputes). 
59 781 F.3d 820 (6th Cir. 2015). 
60 Id. at 822. 
61 Id. at 822-23. 
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Defendant opposed the motion to intervene.  However, 
once it was granted and the fiduciary filed an amended complaint 
against defendant in the class action, defendant moved to dismiss 
the complaint on the ground that those claims belonged in 
arbitration.62  The district court denied the motion to dismiss and 
ruled, sua sponte, that defendant had waived its right to arbitration 
by its conduct before and during litigation.63 
 
The Court of Appeals reversed.  The court noted that “[a] 
party waives arbitration if it acts in a manner ‘completely 
inconsistent with any reliance on an arbitration agreement’ or 
delays asserting arbitration ‘to such an extent that the opposing 
party incur[red] actual prejudice.’”64  The court also held that 
“[b]oth inconsistency and actual prejudice are required.”65  After 
examining defendant’s conduct and the timing of its various 
motions in the related litigation, the court concluded that its 
conduct was not totally inconsistent with its right to arbitrate and, 
in any event, it caused no actual prejudice because plaintiff 
“wasted relatively few resources on unnecessary litigation.”66 
 
  c. Lack of Mutual Assent 
 
Another common law contract doctrine that disputants can  
assert as a defense to arbitrability is the parties did not enter into a 
valid contract due to a lack of mutual assent.  In Knutson v. Sirius 
                                                 
62 Id. at 824. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 827-28 (citing Hurley v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas, 610 
F.3d 334, 338 (6th Cir.2010)). 
65 781 F.3d at 828. 
66 Id. at 830.  The dissent vigorously disputed both of these findings.  Id. 
at 831-37; see also Rushaid v. Nat’l Oilwell Varco, Inc., 757 F.3d 416, 
421-23 (5th Cir. 2014) (reversing district court’s finding of waiver and 
holding that litigation conduct of codefendants cannot be attributed to 
unserved defendant for waiver purposes). 
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XM Radio Inc.,67 the Ninth Circuit applied the common law 
defense of lack of mutual assent to rule that no valid agreement to 
arbitrate existed between a satellite radio customer and the radio 
company.  There, the customer bought a car with a pre-loaded 90-
day trial subscription to satellite radio.  One month after buying the 
car, Sirius XM sent a “Welcome Kit” to the customer, which 
contained, among other things, a Customer Agreement with an 
arbitration clause and a class action waiver.  The customer never 
opened the Welcome Kit.  Alleging he received unauthorized 
phone calls from Sirius XM during the trial period, the customer 
brought a class action under the federal Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act.68  Sirius XM moved to compel individual 
arbitration.  The district court granted the motion.69 
 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed and ruled that there 
was no agreement to arbitrate because of a lack of mutual assent.  
The Court of Appeals found that the customer’s failure to open the 
Welcome Kit meant he could not have seen or read the Customer 
Agreement containing the arbitration clause.  Thus, the customer 
could not have assented to the arbitration provision.  The court 
distinguished prior “shrinkwrap” cases that found mutual assent 
when a customer opened the packaging of a consumer product 
because the customer here never purchased anything directly from 
the consumer company.70  Rather, the customer purchased a car 
directly from Toyota, and he had no reason to know that the 
Welcome Kit that arrived a month later had a Customer Agreement 
with Sirius XM in it.  Without notice of the existence of an 
agreement, the customer could not have assented to it.71  
Therefore, the class action could proceed in court. 
                                                 
67 771 F.3d 559 (9th Cir. 2014). 
68 Id. at 561-64. 
69 Id. at 564. 
70 Id. at 567. 
71 Id. at 567-68; see also Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 
1173 (9th Cir. 2014) (refusing to compel arbitration pursuant to a 
provision in company’s Terms of Use where customer used Barnes & 
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C. Who is a “Customer” Under FINRA   
  Rule 12200? 
 
In FINRA arbitration, even in the absence of a pre-dispute 
arbitration clause in an agreement between the parties, a FINRA 
member firm must arbitrate a claim if “requested by a customer,” 
“[t]he dispute is between a customer and a member or associated 
person of a member; and [t]he dispute arises in connection with the 
business activities of the member or the associated person . . . .”72 
 
Thus, in a customer case, respondents may resist 
arbitration on the ground that claimant is not a “customer” of the 
FINRA member firm within the meaning of FINRA Customer 
Code Rule 12200.  FINRA does not define “customer,” except for 
its mention in Rule 12100(i) (a “customer shall not include a 
broker or dealer”).  Courts continue to refine the definition of the 
term “customer” under FINRA Rule 12200. 
  
The day after last year’s PLI Securities Arbitration 
program, the Second Circuit detailed “the precise boundaries of the 
FINRA meaning of ‘customer.'”  In Citigroup Global Markets 
Inc. v. Abbar,73 the Second Circuit concluded that a Saudi 
businessman who managed family trusts that lost $383 million 
invested with a U.K. affiliate of Citigroup, Inc. (“Citi UK) was not 
a “customer” of Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. (“Citi NY”) under 
Rule 12200, and thus could not compel Citi NY to arbitrate their 
                                                 
Noble's website to purchase a product but was “never prompted to assent 
to the Terms of Use and never in fact read them”).  Accord Walker v. 
Builddirect.Com Technologies Inc., __ P.3d __,  2015 OK 30, ¶ 10, 2015 
WL 207496 (Okla. May 5, 2015) (answering question certified to it by 
the Tenth Circuit and concluding that “Terms of Sale” located on 
defendant’s website, which included an arbitration clause, were not 
incorporated by reference into the parties' written contractual agreement). 
72 FINRA R. 12200. 
73 761 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2014). 
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dispute.  The Court of Appeals issued “a bright-line rule” and held 
that “a ‘customer’ under FINRA Rule 12200 is one who, while not 
a broker or dealer, either (1) purchases a good or service from a 
FINRA member, or (2) has an account with a FINRA 
member.”74  The court reasoned that a “simple, predictable and 
suitably broad definition of ‘customer'” is “necessary” to avoid a 
“sprawling litigation” that its previous definition required, which 
“defeats the express goals of arbitration to yield economical and 
swift outcomes.”75  Because Abbar purchased no goods or services 
from Citi NY (though some of its employees helped develop 
trading strategies for his accounts) and had no account with it, he 
was not a “customer” of Citi NY.76 
 
Of course, the court recognized that, as with all legal 
definitions, exceptions exist for “rare instances of injustice.”77  In 
my view, this exception seems to swallow the rule, as litigants will 
now call for a detailed examination of the facts to mine for 
injustices. 
 
D. Can a Forum Selection Clause Trump the Duty 
  to Arbitrate? 
 
A question related to “who is a customer” is whether a 
FINRA member’s duty to arbitrate at the request of a customer 
under Rule 12200 supersedes a forum selection clause in a 
customer agreement.  The Courts of Appeal currently are split on 
the question. 
  
                                                 
74 Id. at 275. 
75 Id. at 276. 
76 Id.; see also SagePoint Fin., Inc. v. Small, No. 15-CV-0571, 2015 BL 
150905 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2015) (applying Abbar test and finding 
investor, who invested with an associated person four years after he left 
plaintiff broker-dealer, was not a “customer” of broker-dealer).  
77 Id. 
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Last August, the Second Circuit followed an April 2014 
decision by the Ninth Circuit in Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. City of 
Reno78 — rejecting an opposite holding by the Fourth Circuit79 — 
and held that a forum selection clause in a contract supersedes a 
broker-dealer’s obligation to arbitrate disputes with a customer 
under FINRA Rule 12200.  The Court of Appeals, in a single 
opinion, resolved two cases: Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Golden 
Empire Sch. Fin. Auth., and Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc. v. N.C. 
E. Mun. Power Agency.80   In the first case, Golden Empire 
Schools Financing Authority & Kern High School District issued 
approximately $125 million of auction-rate securities (“ARS”) in 
2004, 2006 and 2007, for which Goldman Sachs was an 
underwriter and broker-dealer.   In the second case, the North 
Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency retained Citigroup 
Global Markets Inc. as its underwriter and broker-dealer.  In both 
cases, the issuers claimed that the member firms fraudulently 
induced them to issue the ARS.81   
 
For each issuance, the parties executed an underwriter 
agreement, and a broker dealer agreement.  While the underwriting 
agreements were silent as to dispute resolution, the broker-dealer 
agreements contained forum selection clauses which required “all 
actions and proceedings” related to the transactions between the 
parties be brought in court.82  
 
                                                 
78 747 F. 3d 733 (9th Cir. 2014) (concluding that the City of Reno, which 
had retained Goldman, Sachs for advisory and underwriting services in 
connection with its issuance of auction-rate securities to finance a series 
of city projects, was a “customer” under FINRA Rule 12200).  For a 
more detailed discussion of the Reno case, see Arbitration Case Law 
Update 2014, in PLI Securities Arbitration 2014 Coursebook, at pp. 24-
25.  
79 UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 2013). 
80 764 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2014). 
81 Id. at 212-13. 
82 Id.  
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In 2012, Golden Empire commenced a FINRA arbitration, 
alleging that Goldman fraudulently induced it to issue the ARS. 
Also in 2012, NCEMPA brought a similar FINRA arbitration 
against Citigroup.  In both cases, the member firm sought to enjoin 
the FINRA arbitration on the ground that the forum selection 
clause superseded its duty to arbitrate under Rule 12200.83   The 
issuer responded that, because it was a customer of a FINRA 
member firm, the firm had a duty to arbitrate the dispute under 
FINRA Rule 12200.84   
  
 The Court of Appeals held that the forum selection clause 
superseded FINRA’s mandatory arbitration rule.85  The court 
reasoned that Rule 12200 was a “default” agreement to arbitrate 
that was trumped by the later-executed agreement – the forum 
selection clause.86  The court further reasoned that the underwriting 
agreement contained a merger clause and thus the earlier 
agreement under Rule 12200 merged into the forum selection 
clause.87 
 
I believe the Second Circuit’s ruling is wrong.  A 
fundamental premise to the ruling (that I believe is flawed) is that 
Rule 12200 is an agreement to arbitrate that somehow is executed 
before the parties entered into the underwriting agreements.  
However, the duty to arbitrate arose at the exact same time as the 
execution of the agreements establishing the broker-customer 
relationship.  And, as I see it, the duty to arbitrate is ongoing – at 
                                                 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 214. 
85 Id. at 215. 
86 Id.; see also Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Tracy, 2015 WL 
170241, *51 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2015) (slip op.) (holding that “more 
specific” forum selection clause trumped duty to arbitrate a member 
dispute with its employee under FINRA Rule 13200). 
87 Id. at 216.  In an interesting development, the Second Circuit agreed to 
stay the issuance of its mandate blocking arbitration to allow the issuers 
time to appeal the case to the Supreme Court.   
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any time a customer can invoke Rule 12200 and request a FINRA 
member firm to arbitrate a dispute. 
 
In addition, one argument the parties did not pursue is that 
recently amended sec. 29(a) of the Exchange Act voids the parties’ 
forum selection clause. That provision voids “[a]ny condition, 
stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance 
with any provision of this title or of any rule or regulation 
thereunder, or of any rule of a self-regulatory organization…”88  
Dodd-Frank amended § 29(a) to include the phrase “or of any rule 
of a self-regulatory organization.”  Thus, since 2010, § 29(a) 
explicitly invalidates provisions in brokerage agreements that 
require customers to waive compliance with FINRA rules.  To the 
extent courts have held in the past that parties could contract 
around FINRA rules, that line of cases seems to be vitiated by 
amended § 29(a). 
 
Now that there is a split in the circuits, perhaps the issue 
will ultimately make its way to the Supreme Court. 
 
E. Nonsignatories to Arbitration    
  Agreements 
 
Under state law theories of equitable estoppel, agency or 
third-party beneficiary, nonsignatories may be able to compel 
arbitration of claims arising out of an arbitration agreement 
between signatories.89  Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, 
generally a nonsignatory can enforce an arbitration clause with a 
signatory: 
 
                                                 
88 15 U.S.C. §78cc (2014). 
89 See Arthur Andersen LLP v Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624 (2009) (holding 
that, under the FAA, state law principles may permit an arbitration 
agreement to be enforced by or against a nonsignatory). 
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(1) when a signatory must rely on the terms of the 
written agreement in asserting its claims against the nonsignatory 
or the claims are ‘intimately founded in and intertwined with’ the 
underlying contract, and  
(2) when the signatory alleges substantially 
interdependent and concerted misconduct by the nonsignatory and 
another signatory and ‘the allegations of interdependent 
misconduct [are][ founded in or intimately connected with the 
obligations of the underlying agreement.’90   
 
Likewise, if a nonsignatory can demonstrate it is a third-
party beneficiary of an arbitration agreement, it can enforce that 
agreement against signatories.91 Under the agency theory, a 
nonsignatory can invoke arbitration against a signatory “if a 
preexisting confidential relationship, such as an agency 
relationship between the nonsignatory and one of the parties to the 
arbitration agreement, makes it equitable to impose the duty to 
arbitrate upon the nonsignatory.”92 
 
In the past year, some Courts of Appeal narrowly 
construed these three exceptions.93  Other courts were more willing 
                                                 
90 See Kramer v. Toyota Motor Corp., 705 F.3d 1122, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 
2013) (internal citations omitted).  
91 See Fundamental Admin. Servs., LLC v. Patton, 504 F. App’x 694, 698 
(10th Cir. 2012). 
92 See Murphy v. DirectTV, Inc., 724 F.3d 1218, 1232 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). 
93 E.g., Flintkote Co. v. Aviva PLLC, 769 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(reversing district court’s invocation of equitable estoppel doctrine to 
compel nonsignatory to arbitrate); Griswold v. Coventry First LLC, 762 
F.3d 264 (3d Cir. 2014) (affirming district court’s refusal to compel 
nonsignatory to arbitrate on equitable estoppel grounds). Accord Pinnacle 
Trust Co., L.L.C. v. McTaggart, 152 So. 3d 1123, 1124 (Miss. 2014) 
(refusing to compel nonsignatory beneficiaries to trust agreement to 
arbitrate claims against trust advisor for mishandling funds because the 
agreement specifically excluded nonsignatories, including third-party 
beneficiaries). 
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to compel arbitration with a nonsignatory.94   
 
F.  Unavailability of forum  
 
The Eleventh Circuit this past year refused to compel 
arbitration of a dispute that was subject to an arbitration clause 
because the designated forum was not available.  In Inetianbor v. 
Cashcall, Inc.,95 plaintiff borrowed money from defendant, a loan 
servicer, at a high interest rate. The loan agreement contained a 
pre-dispute arbitration clause that called for “‘Arbitration, which 
shall be conducted by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation by 
an authorized representative in accordance with its consumer 
dispute rules and the terms of this Agreement.’”96  When Plaintiff 
sued in district court for the Southern District of Florida, the court 
initially compelled arbitration.  However, when plaintiff returned 
with a letter from the tribe that stated that it “does not authorize 
Arbitration,” the district court ultimately denied the motion.97 
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the forum 
selection clause in the arbitration agreement was an “integral part 
of the agreement to arbitrate” rather than an “ancillary logistical 
provision.”98  Since the tribal forum was not available to arbitrate 
the dispute, the court could preclude arbitration under “strong” 
Eleventh Circuit precedent.99 
                                                 
94 See Torres v. Simpatico, Inc., 781 F.3d 963, 971 (8th Cir. 2015) 
(affirming district court’s order compelling nonsignatory to arbitrate as 
third-party beneficiary).  Accord Machado v. System4 LLC, 28 N.E.3d 
401 (Mass. 2015) (compelling franchisees to arbitrate claims against 
nonsignatory regional franchisor under doctrine of equitable estoppel). 
95 768 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2014). 
96 Id. at 1348 (quoting loan agreement). 
97 Id. at 1348-49. 
98 Id. at 1350 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
99 Id. (citing Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1222 
(11th Cir. 2000) (holding that “the failure of the chosen forum preclude[s] 
arbitration” whenever “the choice of forum is an integral part of the 
agreement to arbitrate, rather than an ancillary logistical concern”)). 
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G. Vacating Arbitration Awards 
 
To challenge a valid arbitration award that is governed by 
the FAA, parties must establish one of the four grounds listed 
under section 10 of the FAA.100  Disputants rarely invoke section 
10(a)(1) (“where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or 
undue means”), but they more frequently invoke sections 10(a)(2)-
(4), which are discussed below. 
 
 1. Evident Partiality  
 
Losing parties to arbitration awards can seek vacatur 
pursuant to FAA § 10(a)(2) if they show “evident partiality” in one 
or more arbitrators.  Courts have had difficulty developing a test 
for “evident partiality,” since the Supreme Court’s only decision 
under that subsection is the 47-year old decision in Commonwealth 
Coatings v. Continental Casualty Co.101  That case yielded plurality 
and concurring opinions that are difficult to synthesize.  Most 
circuits follow a version of the test set forth thirty years ago by the 
Second Circuit:102 “evident partiality” is “where a reasonable 
person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one 
party to the arbitration.”103 
 
Courts differ on how an arbitrator’s failure to disclose 
potential sources of conflicts of interest factors into an evident 
partiality analysis.  In one interesting case this past year, the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated a district court order 
intervening in an ongoing arbitration and disqualifying an 
                                                 
100 See Hall St. Assoc., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
101 393 U.S. 145 (1968). 
102 See Morelite Constr. v. New York City Dist. Council Carpenters Ben. 
Funds, 748 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1984).  
103 Id. at 83. 
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arbitrator on the grounds that respondents in the arbitration would 
likely prevail on a motion to vacate for evident partiality.104   
 
After an arbitrator was appointed to hear disputes over 
condominium purchases, respondents learned the arbitrator was 
involved in the litigation finance business.  When the AAA denied 
respondents’ pre-hearing disqualification motion, respondents 
sought extraordinary relief in the district court.105  Respondents 
asked the district court to intervene in the arbitration for purposes 
of disqualifying the arbitrator before the hearing so as to avoid the 
delay and expense of a hearing.106 
 
The district court ruled that the arbitrator’s involvement in 
the litigation finance activities suggested an eventual award could 
be vacated for “evident partiality.”  The lower court “reasoned that 
the undisclosed facts regarding Hare's litigation financing activities 
suggested he had a financial interest in the outcome of the 
arbitration, because a victory and large financial award for Sussex 
would help Hare promote his company, which was designed to 
generate profits from funding large, potentially profitable 
litigations.”107   
 
Claimants filed with the Court of Appeal a petition for a 
writ of mandamus directing the district court to vacate its order 
disqualifying the arbitrator.  The Ninth Circuit granted the writ.  
The Court concluded that the circumstances did not give rise to a 
claim of “evident partiality” within the meaning of FAA §10(a)(2).  
The court reasoned that the “undisclosed facts regarding [the 
arbitrator’s] modest efforts to start a company to attract investors 
for litigation financing do not give rise to a reasonable impression 
                                                 
104 In re Sussex, 781 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2015). 
105 Id. at 1069-70. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 1070. 
 26 
that [the arbitrator] would be partial toward either party.”108  In 
addition, the court concluded that the district court’s decision to 
intervene pre-award was “clear error,” as respondents would have 
the option of filing a motion to vacate if they lost the arbitration.109   
 
In a state case, the Supreme Court of Alabama vacated a 
FINRA arbitration award on the ground of evident partiality.110  
Claimant, the administrator of a self-insured group workers’ 
compensation fund, sued respondents, which served as the 
investment advisor and broker-dealer for the fund, for breach of 
fiduciary duty and other claims arising out their alleged 
mishandling of the fund’s investments.   
 
After the panel denied all of claimant’s claims, claimant 
moved to vacate the award under FAA §10(a)(2) on the grounds 
that two of the three panelists “failed to disclose material and 
relevant information during the arbitrator-selection process.”111  
Claimant alleged first that one of the public panelists failed to 
disclose that he was “a defendant in five lawsuits alleging against 
him claims substantially similar to those asserted” in this 
arbitration.112  In addition, claimant alleged that the non-public 
arbitrator failed to disclose that he was a long-time vice 
president/partner in a financial services firm that “had a close, 
ongoing, and material relationship with [respondent] and its 
counsel at the time of the arbitration proceeding.”113  The trial 
court denied the motion to vacate. 
 
                                                 
108 Id. at 1074. 
109 Id. at 1075. 
110 Mun. Workers Comp. Fund, Inc. v. Morgan Keegan..., --- So.3d ---, 
2015 WL 1524911 (Ala. Apr. 3, 2015). 
111 Id. at *4. 
112 Id.  
113 Id.  Claimant presented, among other things, evidence that the 
arbitrator’s firm had been a co-underwriter with respondent on 36 
different multi-million dollar offerings. 
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The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed.  The court first 
adopted a “reasonable impression of partiality” standard rather 
than require that a movant demonstrate “actual bias” in order to 
succeed on a §10(a)(2) motion.114  The court then found that the 
non-public arbitrator’s failures to disclose did present a 
“reasonable impression of partiality.”   As a result, the court 
vacated the award, concluding that claimant had demonstrated that 
at least one arbitrator was evidently partial.115 
 
2. Refusal to Hold a Hearing 
 
 A court can vacate an award under FAA §10(a)(3) if the 
losing party shows “the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in 
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or 
in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the 
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of 
any party have been prejudiced.”116  The Second Circuit recently 
interpreted this ground: 
 
Vacatur under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) is warranted only when 
the arbitration proceedings were “fundamentally unfair.” 
Fairness requires arbitrators to give a party an “adequate 
opportunity to present its evidence and argument,” but it 
does not require them to “hear all the evidence proffered 
by a party.”  Moreover, “[a]rbitrators have substantial 
discretion to admit or exclude evidence.”117 
In Global Gold, the Court of Appeal denied the motion to vacate 
under this prong despite the arbitral tribunal’s refusal to conduct an 
                                                 
114 Id. at *21. 
115 Id. at *28.  In light of this finding, the court did not address the alleged 
evident partiality of one of the public arbitrators.  Id. 
116 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (2014). 
117 Global Gold Mining, LLC v. Ayvazian, __ F. App’x__, 2015 WL 
1881361, at *3 (2d Cir. Apr. 27, 2015) (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted). 
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evidentiary hearing because it considered documents and heard 
oral arguments before reaching the challenged ruling.118  Thus, the 
arbitration proceedings were not “fundamentally unfair.” 
 
 3. Exceeding Powers 
   
 Since arbitrators derive all of their authority to decide 
disputes from the parties’ arbitration agreement, a court can vacate 
an award under §10(a)(4) if the arbitrators exceed the authority 
provided by that agreement.119  Under this ground for vacatur, 
courts consider only “whether the arbitrators even arguably 
interpreted the Agreement in reaching their award; …not whether 
their interpretations of the Agreement or the governing law were 
correct.”120  The Fifth Circuit noted recently that, “[b]y submitting 
issues for an arbitrator's consideration, parties may expand an 
arbitrator's authority beyond that provided by the original 
arbitration agreement.”121   
 This past year, the Supreme Court of South Dakota 
vacated an award that included attorney’s fees to claimant when 
                                                 
118 Id. 
119 See, e.g., PoolRe Ins. Corp. v. Organizational Strategies, Inc., 783 
F.3d 256, 265 (5th Cir. 2015) (affirming district court’s vacatur of award 
because arbitrator exceeded his authority since he was not appointed 
pursuant to the contract’s arbitrator selection provision and because he 
acted contrary to the forum-selection clauses in the relevant arbitration 
agreements). 
120 BNSF Ry. Co. v. Alstom Transp., Inc., 777 F.3d 785, 789 (5th Cir. 
2015); see also First State Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Casualty Co., 781 F.3d 7 (1st 
Cir. 2015) (affirming denial of motion to vacate because arbitrators 
arguably interpreted underlying agreement); Davis v. Producers Agric. 
Ins. Co., 762 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2014) (reversing district court’s vacatur 
of award on exceeding powers ground). 
121 OMG, L.P. v. Heritage Auctions, Inc., No. 14-10403, __ F. App’x __, 
2015 WL 2151779, at *1 (5th Cir. May 8, 2015). 
 29 
the parties’ arbitration agreement expressly provided that “each 
shall pay their own attorney's fees.”122 
 4. Manifest Disregard of the Law 
 
Since the Supreme Court’s holding in Hall St. Assoc., 
L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.123 that the FAA provides the exclusive 
grounds for review of an arbitration award and parties to an 
arbitration agreement cannot contractually expand the judicial 
grounds of review, the circuit courts have split on whether an 
arbitration panel’s “manifest disregard of the law” is a valid 
ground to vacate an arbitration award.  The Supreme Court 
expressly declined to resolve this split in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.124  The circuit split continues unchanged 
since last year’s Arbitration Law Update, as follows: 
 
 The Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits 
acknowledge the continued vitality of the “manifest disregard” 
ground of vacatur.125 
                                                 
122 See Black Hills Surgical Physicians, LLC v. Setliff, III, 855 N.W.2d 
407 (S.D. 2014).  The court applied standards for vacatur under South 
Dakota law but cited precedent interpreting the “exceeding powers” 
ground of the FAA. 
123 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
124 559 U.S. 662, 672 n.3 (2010). 
125 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 94 (2d 
Cir. 2008), vacated on other grounds, 559 U.S. 662 (2010); Wachovia 
Sec., LLC v. Brand, 671 F.3d 472, 482 (4th Cir. 2012) (“Although we 
find that manifest disregard continues to exist as either an independent 
ground for review or as a judicial gloss, we need not decide which of the 
two it is because Wachovia’s claim fails under both”); Coffee Beanery, 
Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., 300 F. App’x 415, 419 (6th Cir. 2008); Comedy 
Club, Inc. v.  Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 2009).  
But see Schafer v. Multiband Corp., 551 F. App’x 814, 2014 WL 
30713,*4 (6th Cir. Jan. 6, 2014) (suggesting that the Sixth Circuit might 
revisit the issue, “which has not been firmly settled”). 
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 The Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have 
expressly ruled that manifest disregard is no longer a valid vacatur 
ground.126   
 The First and Tenth Circuits have addressed 
“manifest disregard” subsequent to Hall Street, but only in dicta.127 
 The Third and Tenth Circuits have expressly 
declined to address the issue.128   
 The Seventh Circuit has held that “manifest 
disregard” is not a ground of vacatur, except if arbitrators order 
parties to violate the legal rights of others.129 
                                                 
126 See Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 352 (5th Cir. 
2009); Medicine Shoppe Intern., Inc. v. Turner Inv., Inc., 614 F.3d 485 
(8th Cir. 2010); Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313, 1324 (11th 
Cir. 2010).   
127 See Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Fenyk, 780 F.3d 59, 65 (1st 
Cir. 2015) (acknowledging that the circuit has “not squarely determined 
whether our manifest disregard case law can be reconciled with Hall 
Street”) (internal quotation and citation omitted); Affinity Fin. Corp. v. 
AARP Fin., Inc., 468 F. App’x 4, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (assuming without 
deciding that manifest disregard of the law standard survived Hall Street). 
128 See Bellantuono v. ICAP Sec. USA, LLC, 557 F. App’x 168, 174 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (recognizing circuit split and expressly declining to decide that 
issue); Rite Aid N.J., Inc. v. United Food Commercial Workers Union, 
Local 1360, 449 F. App’x 126, 129 (3d Cir. 2011) (assuming without 
deciding that the manifest disregard standard survived Hall Street); 
Abbott v. Law Office of Patrick J. Mulligan, 440 F. App’x 612, 620 (10th 
Cir. 2011) (“in the absence of firm guidance from the Supreme Court, we 
decline to decide whether the manifest disregard standard should be 
entirely jettisoned”).  
129 See Affymax, Inc. v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharm., Inc., 660 F.3d 
281, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Except to the extent recognized in George 
Watts & Son [v. Tiffany & Co., Inc., 248 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2001) (ruling 
that “a court may set aside an award that directs the parties to violate the 
legal rights of third persons who did not consent to the arbitration”)], 
‘manifest disregard of the law’ is not a ground on which a court may 
reject an arbitrator's award under the Federal Arbitration Act.”). But see 
Renard v. Ameriprise Fin. Servs., Inc., 778 F.3d 563, 567 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(stating, in dicta, that an award can be vacated under §10(a)(4) “if the 
arbitrator deliberately disregards what he knows to be the law”) (internal 
quotation omitted). 
